International sanctions as a primary institution of international society. by Wilson,  Peter & Yao,  Joanne
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
21 June 2018
Version of attached file:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Not peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Wilson, Peter and Yao, Joanne (2018) 'International sanctions as a primary institution of international
society.', in International organization in the anarchical society : the institutional structure of world order.
Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 127-148. Palgrave studies in international relations.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71622-06
Publisher's copyright statement:
Wilson P., Yao J. (2019) International Sanctions as a Primary Institution of International Society. In: Brems Knudsen
T., Navari C. (eds) International Organization in the Anarchical Society. Palgrave Studies in International Relations.
Palgrave Macmillan, Cham reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. This extract is taken from the author's
original manuscript and has not been edited. The definitive, published, version of record is available here:
https://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9783319716213
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
6 
International Sanctions as a Primary Institution of International Society  
Peter Wilson and Joanne Yao 
International sanctioning is an idea which became a right, in certain circumstances a duty, and 
is now a practice. While acknowledging that the status of international sanctioning as an 
institution of international society is difficult to prove (Wilson 2012), this chapter assumes that 
the practice is now sufficiently complex and deep to make reference to it as an institut ion 
reasonable. If so, what kind of institution is it?  The burgeoning literature on ‘primary’ or 
‘fundamental’ institutions suggests several possibilities. It could be seen as a ‘procedural’ 
institution along with inter alia diplomacy, trade and war, the purpose of which is to protect 
and support the ‘foundational’ institutions of sovereignty, territoriality and international law 
(Holsti 2004, 21-27). It could be seen as a ‘derivative’ institution (along with non-intervention 
and law) of the ‘master’ institution of sovereignty; or alternatively a derivative institut ion 
(along with alliances, war and the balance of power) of the master institution of great power 
management (Buzan 2004, 161-204). Different English School theorists have different 
schemes and a settled scheme has yet to emerge. This does not, however, prevent us from 
exploring the relationship between institutions, and the purpose of this chapter is to explore the 
reciprocal effects of the increasingly institutionalized practice of sanctions on the institut ions 
(whether foundational, master, procedural or derivative) of war and great power management. 
The chapter begins by exploring the concept of international sanctions as a practice for states 
to collectively punish the violation of pivotal international norms through the institutionalized 
authority of international organizations. Rather than considering sanctions as a purely 
instrumental foreign policy tool, we conceptualize international sanctions as a way for states 
to reaffirm core constitutive principles of international society, stigmatize transgressors, and 
deter future norm violations. The chapter then broadly charts the development of internationa l 
sanctions from the Concert of Europe to the early 21st century and traces how internationa l 
sanctions as a practice shaped the institutions of great power management and war. In so doing, 
we show how ‘secondary’ institutions, primarily the United Nations (UN), through 
institutionalized practices such as international sanctions, can change the understanding or 
shape the transformation of certain primary institutions.  
International Sanctions as Communal Penalties 
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International sanctions are measures taken collectively by states to ensure compliance with 
major international norms. They are measures taken in extremis when lesser means have failed 
to bring about the desired result. Hence, these measures are rarely isolated practices but form 
part of international society’s toolkit to uphold and enforce norms. Sanctions can be diplomatic, 
social, cultural, economic and military. The logic of sanctions is simple: breach major 
international norms and collectively imposed costs will follow. One main purpose of sanctions 
is instrumental: to ensure compliance with the breached norm. Much scholarship on the use of 
sanctions—bilateral and multilateral, comprehensive and targeted—have focused on this 
instrumental aspect and have questioned the effectiveness of employing sanctions in achieving 
foreign policy goals (Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot 1990; Pape 1997; Solingen 2012).  
But international sanctions also perform important signalling and deterrent functions. They 
signal perhaps more than any other action which international norms are the most important. 
These are the norms transgression of which provokes the deepest and most widespread 
disapprobation, as measured by the length states are prepared to go to uphold them.  Length 
here usually means pain. International sanctions hurt the imposing states as well as the target. 
Attempts at burden-sharing—at redistributing costs from those less able to bear them to those 
more able—have not proved successful. In sending out a strong signal that certain 
transgressions will not be tolerated, and will likely meet with a strong response, internationa l 
sanctions also perform an important deterrent function. Their purpose is not only to reverse the 
current act of norm violation but deter future miscreant acts, not only by this state but by any 
state (Baldwin 1985, 145-205, 370-74).  
While often thought of merely as tools of foreign policy, international sanctions properly 
speaking are highly communal engagements. It is in this respect that the classic definition of 
Doxey is deficient. It is true that ‘international sanctions … are penalties threatened or imposed 
as a declared consequence of the target’s failure to observe international standards or 
international obligations’ (Doxey 1987, 4). But for them to be properly international sanctions 
the penalties have to be collectively threatened or imposed. But there is a second, deeper, 
respect in which international sanctions are communal. They are expressive of the moral 
character of a society, in particular its moral base lines—the rules and principles violation of 
which it is loath to tolerate, even in the most exceptional circumstances. They are also 
expressive of the coherence of any given society, its capacity for solidarity in the face of major 
threats to its well-being—the difficulty in international society being that there is rarely much 
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agreement on the source, nature and magnitude of such threats, and the moral base lines are 
largely determined by a small sub-set of international society viz. the great powers.   
The difficulty of cooperation in a highly heterogeneous international society notwithstand ing, 
the communal nature of international sanctions makes it a highly appropriate subject for the 
‘societal approach’ (Buzan 2014) of the English School (ES). For what we are dealing with 
here is not just ‘raw’ and ‘observable’ ‘behaviour’ but ‘conduct’, that is, ethically informed 
behaviour. The issue is not only what states do but why they do it and for what ends? The 
assumption is that states are not just rational utility-maximisers, or means-ends calculators, but 
social subjects. Their behaviour is shaped as much by social expectations and the desire to 
maintain social standing as it is by rational calculation of advantage—or at least the social 
element always has a substantial constraining or enabling effect. As Manning argued, states 
conduct themselves  
…in the presence of a cloud of witnesses, comprising a diversity of what to the social 
psychologist are known as reference groups. And, as often as not, if it be wondered why 
a state has done this or that, and no more obvious explanation avails, the answer is that, 
in doing this or that, it was meeting the expectations of some politically or 
diplomatically consequential reference group (1972, 323-33). 
For Manning, regard for international norms was largely a function of the expectations of the 
relevant reference group, and ‘the less your indignation, the less my self-restraint’ (Manning 
1972, 323).  
At this point it is important to make two further conceptual distinctions. Firstly, internationa l 
sanctions have to be distinguished from sanctions in general. The former are not only 
collectively agreed and imposed measures but such measures agreed within the framework of 
an international organisation and imposed under the authority of that organisation. This is what 
gives them their sanctity. They are not merely measures imposed by one state or a few states 
in pursuit of their individual or joint interests, but measures imposed by a collective ly 
significant and recognised grouping of states. Hence, the UN as a secondary institution is not 
only a product or expression of primary institutions but can, through its practices such as 
international sanctions, reinforce and instigate changes in primary institutions such as great 
power management and war. What makes these secondary institutions significant is their 
formal grounding in some venerated and/or authoritative treaty or charter and the 
institutionalized nature of their practices over time. This prompts the second distinct ion: 
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international sanctions are not merely instruments to achieve foreign policy objectives; they 
are not merely one among several ‘means of pressure’ (Northedge 1976). Rather, as we say at 
the outset, they are measures imposed to defend and promote an important international norm 
or principle. This is a further source of their sanctity; it is why we expect sanctions to be 
collective; it is also why we expect the collective to be large and/or significant with regard to 
some quality of its composition; and in practice this usually entails formal organisation. 
The very word ‘sanctions’ suggests measures that are incontrovertibly just and decent. This is 
why its employment has become highly popular; but it is also why its meaning has been 
corrupted. States now use the label sanctions to cover and dignify all manner of acts, not 
exclusively those to defend an important norm with the backing of a major internationa l 
organisation. States will often seek to cajole other states into joining them to provide a fig- lea f 
of respectability. Those with the capability will attempt to get the imprimatur of some 
international organisation in which it is dominant: one thinks here of the United States (US) 
with respect to the Organisation of American States, or Russia with respect to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. The matter is not helped by the fact that the media daily 
uses the word sanctions loosely. Taking what states say at face value, it rarely stops to ask 
whether the sanctions being proposed or talked about are not sanctions in any meaningful sense 
but merely foreign policy instruments. It often uses sanctions to mean economic sanctions. 
Indeed, for many people now sanctions and economic sanctions are synonymous, when in fact 
the measures employed can be and usually are much broader (Barber 1979). 
A Derivative of Great Power Management 
The roots of the practice of international sanctions can be found in the concert system of great 
power management of the nineteenth-century. While there is no consensus on the nature of this 
system, how long it lasted, and its historical significance (Hinsley 1963; Holbraad 1970; Jervis 
1985; Clark 1989; Holsti 1992; Mitzen 2013), there can be no doubt it brought into the realm 
of ‘diplomatics’ (Manning 1962) a number of ideas and practices which paved the way for the 
innovations of the League of Nations Covenant and the UN Charter. One of these ideas was 
the negation of the right of any one Power and the assertion of the right of the Powers 
collectively to make decisions on matters affecting the peace of Europe. Another was the 
responsibility of the Powers collectively ‘to enforce the decisions of Europe’. In addition, the 
Congress developed the practice of treating as an ‘international question’ any matter that the 
Powers collectively deemed a threat to the peace of Europe, whether it was a matter that fell 
5 
 
within the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign nation or not (Woolf 1916, 23-37; Wilson 2003, 
34-7). 
Explicit rights and duties regarding international sanctions were first established in the League 
of Nations Covenant. The idea behind them was simple. War had become extremely costly and 
destructive. It could no longer be considered merely as one among many tools open to 
increasingly industrialised and nationalistic states. Without completely removing the individua l 
sovereign right of nations to resort to arms, a way had to be found to put the power and strength 
of the modern nation state to the service of the community rather than against it. The 
decentralised system of fundamental norm enforcement that had hitherto prevailed was no 
longer tenable. A more centralised system harnessing the power and will of the community was 
needed in its place. Building on the work of the Hague Conferences and the principle of 
collective responsibility for international order tentatively established by the European concert 
system, the League of Nations sought to put international relations on a more ordered and 
organised footing. The right to go to war was heavily proscribed. Rekindling a long dormant 
Grotian idea, the use of force was to be conceived (largely) either as an act of violence against 
the community or an act of community law enforcement. Under Article 16 of the League 
Covenant members undertook to immediately apply wide-ranging economic measures against 
any member of the League resorting to war in disregard of its covenants. Members of the 
League Council undertook to recommend what armed forces members of the League should 
contribute to protect these covenants (Henig 1973, 184-5). The obligation to impose social and 
economic sanctions was therefore strong under the Covenant. They were to be immediate, all-
encompassing and admitting of no exception.  The obligation to impose military sanctions , 
however, was weak. They amounted to no more than an obligation to consider a 
recommendation from the Council on the armed forces they might voluntarily contribute to any 
proposed collective enforcement effort. 
The failure of the League to act decisively against acts of aggression in Manchuria, Abyssinia 
and the Rhineland in the 1930s was partly attributed to flaws within the Covenant.  The UN 
Charter sought to make amends. First and foremost, the unanimity requirement (Article 5) for 
League Council decisions on disputes likely to lead to a rupture of the peace was abandoned. 
In its place was put the requirement of a qualified majority of 9 affirmative votes in the 15 
member UN Security Council, but with each of the prevailing five great powers enjoying a 
right of veto (Article 27). The automaticity of social and economic sanctions was replaced by 
the requirement of a decision by the Security Council on what measures ‘not involving the use 
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of armed force’ but including ‘complete or partial interruption of economic relations’, means 
of communication and diplomatic relations, should be applied in response to a threat to or 
breach of the peace (Article 41). Finally, the obligation to impose military sanctions was 
strengthened with the Security Council given the authority, if measures under Article 41 failed 
or were deemed inadequate, to ‘take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary 
to maintain or restore international peace and security’ (Article 42). 
Drawing on the experience of the 1930s the UN Charter equipped the international community 
with a modified Grotian model of the relationship between law and war. The Security Council 
was given enhanced executive power to define threats to and breaches of the peace and legally 
oblige member states to apply the measures it deemed necessary to bring the situation under 
control. It also gave the five victorious great powers of World War Two an elevated place in 
the new arrangement. It was precisely this elevated place that led to international sanctions 
being rarely employed during the Cold War despite the occurrence of many threats and 
breaches. Only two such threats and breaches proved to be sufficiently above the fray of Cold 
War politics for the permanent members to be in agreement on international measures under 
Chapter VII for the enforcement of international peace and security. These cases were the threat 
posed by the rebel white supremacist regime in the British colony of Rhodesia, and the threat 
posed by South Africa’s policy of apartheid and its continued illegal occupation of South West 
Africa. 
The parents of international sanctions had high hopes for their children when they were brought 
into this world on 10 January 1920 when the Covenant of the League of Nations entered into 
force. But an uneventful and unproblematic first decade was followed by a highly problematic 
second; prompting something of a rebirth mid-way through the third. Of course, the world in 
which they had to find their way was hardly hospitable, and some have concluded that so it 
will always be and it might have been better if they had not been brought into this world at all. 
Hedley Bull argued, for example, that the Grotian conception of international society is always 
susceptible to corruption by the Hobbesian, communal concern and solidarity being all too 
frequently contaminated by power politics. According to this view international sanctions place 
a solidarist burden on international society that its essentially pluralist nature cannot bear (Bull 
1966).  
Those responsible for their progress in the world, however, have not generally shared this view. 
Even during the two periods, inter- and Cold War, when their employment was rare there was 
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little talk of abandoning them. This in itself says something important about internationa l 
society. Even during times when the world was at best a pluralist world of peaceful coexistence, 
and at worst a Hobbesian world of violence and disorder, the solidarist idea of common action 
in defence of common norms, of collective action to protect and promote common purposes , 
was not extinguished. It is the strength of this solidarist idea in practice that we need to establish 
if we are to gain a firm understanding of the place of international sanctions in contemporary 
international society. Another way of putting this is that the League and the UN are based on 
an ‘authority model’ rather than a ‘power model’. Until the end of the Cold War the general 
view was that this ‘authority model’, reflecting ‘orderly procedures and institutionalised 
behaviour’ (Clark 1989, 18-19), existed mainly in the imagination (Doxey 1987, 15-16). The 
question now is the extent to which, in the decades since the end of the Cold War, what was 
once mainly imagined has now become real in the sense of praxis—ideas regularly informing 
and shaping practice. 
International Sanctions as Praxis 
Doxey’s Cold War conclusion was that the UN, like the League before it, provided a forum 
and procedures whereby common standards could be established and in the right circumstances 
collectively enforced. The General Assembly was successful in setting standards on a broad 
range of fronts; but condemnation of standard-breaking was highly selective and collective 
enforcement of common standards rare. The one comprehensive case of UN sanctions was 
directed at the white-minority government of Rhodesia, which unilaterally and illega l ly 
declared itself independent of British rule in 1966 (Baldwin 1985: 190-204). In other cases, 
sanctions were either never discussed in the Security Council, or were blocked by one or more 
of the permanent members (P5) in defence of their own or a client’s interests. In consequence 
of a divided Council, a consistent pattern of sanctioning never materialised. ‘Given the lack of 
consensus on unacceptable behaviour and the absence of a combined will to respond to wrong-
doing, mandatory UN sanctions are predictably unlikely’ (Doxey 1987, 16). 
Even during the Cold War, however, the issue was not so clear-cut. This is because in between 
unilateral action and comprehensive mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter a 
range of collectively agreed and imposed measures were taken against states deemed to be in 
breach of international obligations. Salient cases include the UN mandatory arms embargo 
against apartheid South Africa; European Union (EU) sanctions against Argentina after its 
invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas; Western sanctions against Iran during the Tehran hostage 
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crisis; and Western sanctions against the Soviet Union following its invasion of Afghanis tan 
(Baldwin 1985: 251-78). All of these cases received at least partial legitimation by the UN in 
the form of condemnation of the acts of the target states by the Security Council (or in the last 
case the General Assembly). In the Iran case condemnation was accompanied by a resolution 
threatening ‘effective measures’ under Chapter VII, though a draft resolution authoris ing 
mandatory economic sanctions was vetoed by the Soviet Union.  
These cases show that the distance between minimal and maximum legitimation may be great; 
but even during the Cold War it became an established practice of states to achieve, primarily 
through the UN, the greatest legitimation possible of their proposed collective action. If direct 
authorisation by the highest authority was not possible, at least indirect authorisation, or tacit 
approval of this body was sought, often in conjunction with similar efforts in other bodies. This 
says something highly significant about the diplomatic and sanctioning landscape. Even during 
the Cold War states were nervous about ‘going it alone’. They all sought maximal communa l 
legitimation for their actions, especially through the UN, which became an East-West and 
North-South ideological battleground while at the same time retaining, however nebulous ly 
according to some, its image as the collective conscience and guardian of humankind.  
There were, however, cases where the sanctioning state/states sought legitimation of its/the ir 
actions but were largely unsuccessful. From 1960-1962 the Organisation of American States 
(OAS) imposed sanctions on the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic for acts of 
aggression and intervention in Venezuela. While the Security Council was informed of the 
measures, as required by the OAS Charter, it was divided as to whether the OAS had acted 
improperly in not seeking prior UN authorisation. No substantive resolution was forthcoming, 
the Council merely acknowledging the receipt of information regarding the regional 
implementation of sanctions. Even this acknowledgement did not command a consensus with 
the Soviet Union and Poland abstaining (Doxey 1987, 57-9).  
In 1960 the US began its five-decade campaign of sanctions against the Castro regime in Cuba 
for misdemeanours ranging from expropriation without compensation of foreign-owned assets 
to the export of revolution. On numerous occasions it sought the approval and support of the 
OAS, sometimes successfully sometimes not but almost always with significant opposition or 
foot-dragging. Since 1975 the US has carried on its campaign without OAS support. The 
superpower veto ensured that the Security Council approval or condemnation was never 
seriously pursued (Baldwin 1985: 174-89; Doxey 1987, 59-65).  
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In 1979 the Arab League imposed wide-ranging diplomatic and economic sanctions against 
Egypt for recognising and concluding a peace treaty with Israel. As well as being a blow to 
Arab solidarity it was contended that the treaty contravened a ban on separate agreements with 
Israel agreed at an Arab League summit in 1974. While the measures achieved wide support in 
the General Assembly no attempt was made, given the inevitability of a US veto, to gain the 
approval of the Security Council. The non-aligned movement, of which Egypt was a founding 
member, paid no more than lip service (Doxey 1987, 66-69). The case is significant because it 
raises again the question of how ‘international’ sanctions need to be in order to count as 
international sanctions; and also the question of what is to count as a major international norm. 
To these questions Cold War international society provided no clear answers. 
The Constituting Effects of International Sanctions 
In employing sanctions, the UN Security Council must navigate the tension between mutual 
respect for sovereignty and great power management. In doing so, the Security Council uses 
international sanctions to enforce basic constitutive principles of international society and 
reshape fundamental institutions while potentially contributing to the emergence of new 
constitutive principles. The use of international sanctions are often constitutive acts, creating 
UN subsidiary organs and procedures to coordinate implementation of and monitor compliance 
with sanctions, and sustaining regional organizations in ending conflicts. The practice of UN 
Security Council sanctions also reinforces the aims and policies of other UN bodies such as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the case of Iran and the development of 
weapons of mass destruction, and the UN Human Rights Council in the case of Libya and the 
emerging principle of a ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P).  
Great powers use international sanctions in two interrelated ways—internally as a reinforc ing 
mechanism amongst themselves to solidify certain constitutive principles, and externally as a 
method to stigmatize certain actors that violate, and practices that undermine, core princip les. 
Through this double mechanism, sanctions have been used to reshape the institution of war 
while reinforcing other institutions including international law and great power management. 
Following the Cold War, the permanent members of the UN Security Council—China, Russia, 
the US, the UK and France—achieved some consensus regarding limits to legitimate uses of 
violence, hence the need to further institutionalize war, and used the specific practice of 
international sanctions to do so. In other words, the UN Security Council as an agency of an 
international organization and expression of great power management, through its ability to 
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impose international sanctions, sought to shape the institution of war. The UN Security 
Council’s authority stems in large part from power; its five veto members account for a large 
chunk of the world’s military and economic might. But, as Bull aptly notes, great power 
management also “presupposes and implies the idea of an international society…linked by 
common rules and institutions as well as by contact and interaction” (2012 [1977], 196). Hence, 
the UN Security Council’s authority in imposing sanctions also stems from the great powers’ 
legitimate role and responsibility in maintaining international peace and security.  
The primary institution of mutual recognition of state sovereignty, however, continued to 
constrain great power management and frustrate the efficacy of international sanctions. Ten 
non-permanent members of the UN Security Council are elected every two years by the UN 
General Assembly and may abstain or vote against sanctions that eventually pass. Permanent 
Security Council members, particularly Russia and China, often oppose the application of 
sanctions in an effort to defend state sovereignty, as demonstrated by the failure of proposed 
UN Security Council sanctions against Myanmar in 2007, Zimbabwe in 2008, and Syria in 
2017. Further, as Margaret Doxey stresses, even if international sanctions are approved, 
implementation may be uneven due to lack of political will, or ineffective due to a range of 
practical and circumstantial considerations (2009, 541). Black markets and willful neglect on 
the part of certain parties e.g. frontline states, may allow states a back door to non-compliance.  
The successful use of international sanctions showcases instances where the institutions of 
international law and great power management superseded mutual recognition of sovereignty. 
However, the converse is equally true: the UN Security Council’s failure to agree on sanctions 
for certain transgressions against established international norms speak to the continuing 
centrality of state sovereignty in international society. Further, sanctions applied by regional 
organizations such as the EU, the African Union (AU) or the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), operate alongside UN sanctions (Brzoska 2009). In certain 
instances these actions diminish and in others they augment the authority of the UN, which is 
a complicating factor in the relationship between the fundamental institutions of state 
sovereignty, international law and great power management. But consideration must also be 
given to the influence of sanctioning activity on the most controversial institution in the English 
school’s pantheon of fundamental institutions, that of war. It was to reduce the incidence and 
destructiveness of war and harness it to the will of the community that, as we have seen, the 
practice of international sanctions first developed. The remainder of this chapter will detail 
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how since the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council as a manifestation of great power 
politics has used international sanctions to shape the institution of war.  
Limiting the Institution of War since the End of the Cold War 
The main constitutive principle guiding the UN Security Council’s use of internationa l 
sanctions is the prohibition against the aggressive use of force. In order to mainta in 
international peace and security, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter stipulates that member states 
shall refrain “from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politica l 
independence of any state” with Articles 39-51 detailing measures that may be adopted to 
address transgressions. Article 41 specifically outlines actions, short of armed conflict, that the 
Security Council might use against those who transgress Article 2(4) including the “complete 
or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations”. These sanctions are 
an inward affirmation of principle as well as an outward signal to the world that fundamenta l 
principles upholding international peace and security must not be breached. According to the 
Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC), 15 of 23 uses of international sanctions between 1990 
and 2013 respond directly to a breach of this prohibition against the aggressive use of force 
(2014)1.  
The UN Charter’s prohibition on the aggressive use of force and the Security Council’s use of 
sanctions to stigmatize and punish violators speaks to the narrowing scope and declining 
legitimacy of war as a fundamental institution of international society as outlined by Bull, 
Wight, Jackson and Holsti (Buzan 2004). The institutionalization of war has always been a 
means to limit its destructive tendencies through the development of shared norms and rules of 
engagement. Bull defines war as all “organized violence carried on by political units agains t 
each other” but confines the legitimate use of violence to war between sovereign states (2012 
[1977], 178-9). For Bull, the institutionalization of war as legitimate only between states 
contributes to international order. Holsti charts the de-institutionalization of war since the late-
nineteenth century in almost inverse relationship with the growing body of internationa l law 
regulating conflict (2004, 283-9). But he assesses the situation today as schizophrenic with a 
                                                                 
1 The TSC is a part of the Graduate Institute of Geneva’s Program for the Study of International Governance 
and a project directed by Professor Thomas  Bierstker to house quantitative and qualitative data on UN 
targeted sanctions (http://graduateinstitute.ch/un-sanctions). For every instance of UN sanctions, the 
database codes the effectiveness of the regime as a tool to induce behavioral change, constrain resources 
necessary to continue violations, and stigmatize unruly actors.  
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schism between a ‘zone of peace’ in the developed world where war is outlawed or confined 
to highly institutionalized practices, and the continued de-institutionalization of war in much 
of the developing world (2004, 298-9). Since the end of the Cold War, the UN Security 
Council’s use of sanctions has acted to stem the de-institutionalization of war in the developing 
world by stigmatizing and punishing those who transgress non-aggression and humanitar ian 
norms while at the same time consolidating the institutionalization of war among actors in the 
zone of peace. Nonetheless, Holsti concludes that in many parts of the world today we see 
“almost perfect inconsistency between law, norms, rules, and etiquette on the one hand, and 
actual behavior on the other” (2004, 289). The attempt to restrict the occasion for war, and 
permissible acts within it, has grown pari passu with the erosion of the distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants, disrespect for and abuse of the laws of neutrality, the growth 
of irregular forces relative to regular, and the erosion of the distinction between war and 
criminality. 
The UN Security Council authorized the first post-Cold War international sanctions against 
Iraq in 1990, initiating the ‘sanctions decade’ which saw the Security Council impose sanctions 
16 times, in some cases multiple times against the same state (Cortright and Lopez 2000; Mack 
and Khan 2000). Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the Security Council 
passed Resolution 660 condemning Iraq for its breach of international peace and security and 
calling for Iraq’s immediate withdrawal to antebellum status. Resolution 661 passed on 7 
August 1990 imposed comprehensive sanctions to include naval and air blockades against Iraq 
for its failure to withdraw (Alnasrawi 2001, 208). Subsequently, Security Council Resolution 
687 of 3 April 1991 continued sanctions after the Gulf War2. As many authors have noted (e.g. 
Halliday 1999; Alnasrawi 2001; Sponeck 2006), Iraq imports 70-80% of its caloric intake, and 
long-term international sanctions against Iraq had dire humanitarian consequences despite the 
introduction, in an effort to alleviate civilian suffering, of the controversial Oil-For-Food 
                                                                 
2 Although sanctions imposed by UNSC Resolution 661 were lifted by UNSC Resolution 686 (1991) following 
the Gulf War and the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, UNSC Resolution 687 continued to hold Iraq accountable 
for paying war damages and its continuing threat to support terrorism and develop weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).  This new comprehensive resolution included a long list of requirements for the lifting of 
sanctions, including the elimination of WMD, agreement not to develop WMD in the future, establishment of 
an inspections regime to monitor compliance, and adherence to debt obligations and other financial claims 
(UNSC Resolution 687). Comprehensive international sanctions were finally l ifted in 2003 and replaced with 
targeted sanctions. 
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program in 19963. The humanitarian situation created dissent among the great powers as France 
and Russia opposed further sanctions by the mid-1990s.  
These concerns shaped the subsequent use of targeted rather than comprehensive sanctions to 
punish the offending regime rather than the population4, and crucially to focus the sanctioning 
effort on weapons and weapons-related imports (Cortright, Lopez and Gerber-Stellingwerf 
2007, 350-60; Lopez and Cortright 2004, 100-102). The questionable normative implicat ions 
of international sanctions against Iraq notwithstanding, the decisiveness of Security Council 
Resolution 661 and 687 following the First Gulf War demonstrated the UN Security Council’s 
affirmation of the norm against the use of aggressive war. The sanctions also stigmatized the 
Saddam Hussein regime and limited its sovereignty, particularly its freedom to determine its 
security needs and develop the military capabilities to meet them. From 1990-2003 Iraq’s 
sovereignty in the area of defense was severely and successfully curtailed (Lopez and Cortright 
2004). Here, great power management to govern the institution of war and ensure internationa l 
peace and security won out against the mutual respect for sovereignty.  
In May 1992, following atrocities committed by the Slobodan Milosevic regime, the UN 
Security Council invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter and instituted comprehensive and 
wide-ranging sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) regime in trade, 
travel, finance, scientific cooperation and cultural and sport exchanges, with exceptions for 
foodstuffs and medical supplies (UNSC Resolution 757). The Security Council established the 
UN Sanctions Assistance Mission (SAM) in neighboring countries and a blockade on the 
Danube River to enforce the resolution. While some lauded the UN sanctions as a factor in 
bringing Milosevic to the negotiating table (Cortright and Lopez 2002, 28-9; Luttwark 1995), 
others have highlighted enforcement difficulties that hindered effectiveness and the flourishing 
of illicit trade in the wake of sanctions (Drezner 2000, 84; Andreas 2005). However, willing 
cooperation among the great powers in applying international sanctions against the FRY was 
seen as a model for a new era of multilateral cooperation to enforce the international norm 
against aggression, particularly in cases involving ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
                                                                 
3 The Oil-For-Food Program allowed Iraq to export oil  for humanitarian goods through a UN monitoring 
scheme. During its existence the Oil-For-Food Program processed $64 mill ion of Iraqi oil (Chesterman, 
Johnstone and Malone 2016, 380). However, not only was it burdensome but it tasked the UN secretariat with 
“tasks that are beyond its competence” thus leading to malpractice and corruption (Doxey 2009, 544). 
4 In the late-1990s reports conducted by the Swiss Government, through the ‘Interlaken Process’ and Brown 
University’s Watson Institute for International Studies, formed the foundations for a rethinking of sanctions by 
the UN and the shift towards targeted measures.  
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humanity. Further, the Targeted Sanctions Consortium’s (2014) analysis concluded that the 
sanctions against FRY were effective in clearly articulating the international norms violated 
and stigmatizing the Milosevic regime for their breach. 
In the following decades, the UN Security Council used international sanctions to reinforce 
norms against aggression and institutionalize rules governing armed conflict in largely African 
countries including Liberia, Libya, Somalia, Angola, Haiti, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic. With the exception 
of Haiti in 1994, these sanctions were targeted rather than comprehensive (Cortright, Lopez 
and Gerber-Stellingwerf 2007, 253-6). Despite their varying degrees of effectiveness in 
changing the behavior of offending regimes, all cases demonstrated the UN Security Council’s 
commitment to upholding the norm against aggression and thus limited the scope for legitima te 
violence. In addition, all cases aimed to stigmatize the regimes that violated internationa l 
norms. The case of Ethiopia/Eritrea in 2000 is particularly noteworthy as Russia led debates 
concerning the imposition of sanctions while the US, UK or France led all other post-Cold War 
cases (Brzoska 2015, 1342).  
In addition to stigmatizing the aggressive use of force, these sanctions also strengthened 
positive norms and practices such as the use of diplomacy and regional organizations to 
mediate and resolve conflict (e.g. Ethiopia in 2000, Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, 
Central African Republic in 2013), norms against ethnic cleansing and genocide (e.g. 
Yugoslavia in 1992, Rwanda in 1994), and democratic elections and the peaceful transfer of 
power (e.g. Haiti in 1994, Sierra Leone in 1997, Cote d’Ivoire in 2004, Guinea-Bissau in 2012). 
Hence, even after the ‘sanctions decade’ of the 1990s, the UN Security Council continued to 
use international sanctions as a tool to shape and limit the institution of war in the developing 
world.  
In addition to upholding the principle against the aggressive use of force, the UN Security 
Council also used international sanctions since the end of the Cold War to increase the 
institutionalization of war by barring the state and non-state use of terrorism as a tool of 
conflict, and by forbidding the development of WMD. In 1992, the UN Security Council passed 
several resolutions targeting the Libyan regime for violating the norm against state sponsorship 
of terrorism. During the 1980s, the Qaddafi regime had been linked with a series of terrorist 
incidents including the 1986 TWA Flight 840 bombing, the 1986 La Belle nightclub attack in 
Berlin, the 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 bombing over Lockerbie in Scotland, and the 1989 
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bombing of French UTA Flight 772 over Niger. With evidence gathering against Libya, the 
UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 731 on 21 January 1992 calling on Libya 
to cooperate with investigations and turn over two Pam Am 103 Lockerbie suspects. The 
Security Council then passed Resolution 748 on 31 March 1992 in accordance with Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter imposing an aviation ban, an arms embargo and diplomatic sanctions. 
The Libyan regime’s refusal to comply triggered Resolution 883 of 11 November 1993 with 
the stated goal to “eliminate international terrorism”. Tightened sanctions included a more 
stringent aviation embargo, financial restrictions, and asset freezes against the Libyan 
government.  
The Targeted Sanctions Consortium (2014) assesses the stigmatization effect of sanctions 
against the Libyan regime as mixed as Qaddafi’s diplomatic maneuvers, particularly with the 
African Union, prevented his international isolation. Others have maintained that internationa l 
sanctions were more effective than unilateral measures in altering Qaddafi’s behavior through 
economic and reputational cost (Collins 2004; Lopez and Cortright 2004, 102-103; Zoubir 
2006)—so much so that as of 2004, Libya had only been linked to one suspected incident of 
terrorism since the adoption of UNSC Resolution 731 on 21 January 1992. In 1999 Libya 
complied with this resolution and released the two Pam Am 103 Lockerbie suspects to The 
Hague. Further, the Security Council’s clear articulation of principles demonstrated great 
power consensus on terrorism as a breach of international peace and security and an illegitima te 
instrument of war. The principle against terrorism was affirmed by Security Council Resolution 
1373, adopted unanimously after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and through the use of internationa l 
sanctions against Somalia in 1992, Sudan in 1996, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in 1999, Lebanon 
in 2005, and the Taliban again in 2011.  
In 1996, international sanctions against Iran and North Korea consolidated the use of sanctions 
as a great power management tool to discipline the legitimate use (or potential use) of force to 
preclude WMDs. In October 2006, following North Korea’s first nuclear test, the UN Security 
Council passed Resolution 1718 imposing sanctions on trade in nonconventional weapons, 
large conventional weapons, luxury goods, and on the assets of key individuals. The resolution 
clearly affirmed that nuclear proliferation threatened international peace and security and 
established a sanctions committee to oversee implementation. Following subsequent nuclear 
tests, the Security Council expanded sanctions to all conventional arms in 2009, to some 
financial services in 2013, and finally to a broad range of commodities and financial services 
with Resolution 2270 in 2016.  
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This widening of sanctions moved the UN Security Council from targeted to more 
comprehensive sanctions designed to punish (Berger 2016, 8-9). Support from typically 
cautious Russia and China demonstrated the strength of the UN Security Council consensus on 
the need to counter WMD proliferation. In 2016 the US presented a draft of Resolution 2270 
to China and was surprised by the relatively few amendments China tendered (Berger 2016, 
9). Similarly, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1737 in 2006 in response 
to Iran’s failure to comply with international principles against nuclear proliferation. The 
sanctions targeted Iran’s nuclear program with trade and financial restrictions. Both sanctions 
regimes were designed to stigmatize North Korea and Iran as well as to affirm the UN Security 
Council’s consensus on limits to the means and methods of war. Hence, the UN Security 
Council’s use of sanctions against support for terrorism and WMD programs, similar to 
international sanctions targeting the aggressive use of force, aim to institutionalize war in the 
developing world by limiting the legitimate use and threat of force. 
Expansion of the Institution of War? 
Interestingly, the arrival of R2P as an emerging constitutive principle has the potential to take 
the fundamental institution of war in the opposite direction, extending the parameters of the 
legitimate use of force. Bull highlighted the dual aspects of the institution of war as both a 
threat to international order and a useful tool for its management (2012 [1977]: 191). While 
UN sanctions have been deployed to contain the former threat, R2P’s focus on human security 
and the protection of populations within states from egregious crimes against humanity widens 
rather than narrows the scope of the legitimate use of force.  
The concept of R2P was unveiled at the 2005 World Summit where parties agreed to protect 
civilian populations from ‘atrocity crimes’ (Welsh 2016). Despite its official appearance in the 
early-2000s, the principle has older roots in liberal international theory and early modern 
notions of state responsibility (Doyle 2011; Glanville 2010). The 2011 Libya case represents 
the single instance to date where the R2P principle was explicitly invoked as the rationale 
behind UN Security Council sanctions against an offending regime. In response to the Arab 
Spring and the Qaddafi regime’s repressive measures against demonstrators, the UN Security 
Council passed Resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011 imposing international sanctions against 
Libya in condemnation of human rights atrocities, in particular violence against civilians during 
peaceful demonstrations. The resolution specifically recalls “the Libyan authorit ie s’ 
responsibility to protect its population” as a rationale for invoking Chapter VII and imposing 
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an arms embargo, targeted travel bans, and asset freezes on regime personnel. When the 
situation continued to worsen, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 on 17 March 
2011 imposing a no-fly-zone and authorizing “all necessary means” to protect civilians. Indeed, 
as implied in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, non-military sanctions are the first step towards 
the use of force to uphold international principles, and the use of a broad range of non-military 
sanctions as a first step towards the 2011 Libyan intervention helped legitimize the R2P and 
institutionalize it as part of the primary institution of war. 
It is easy to overstate the importance of international sanctions against Libya under the R2P 
banner as witness to the birth of a new constitutive principle of international society. As 
commentators have observed, the use of international sanctions often serves the narrow 
interests of Security Council members, especially the P5, rather than the lofty principles of 
international morality. While not called R2P, the animating idea behind this ‘new’ norm, that 
sovereignty is a doctrine of responsibility as well as rights, has informed the use of internationa l 
sanctions to institutionalize war since the case of Southern Rhodesia in the 1960s (Hehir 2013, 
141). In retrospect the use of international sanctions have always had a hand in the broadening 
of our understandings of acceptable use of force. Hence, the role of international sanctions in 
shaping the institution of war has always been two-sided: limiting the effective right of states 
to use force, while broadening the international community’s right to bring individual states 
back into line when they fail to comply with established and emerging international princip les.  
R2P and the use of international sanctions to solidify the principle have come under much 
criticism. Sanctioned states often accuse the great powers of using Chapter VII and the UN 
Security Council instrumentally more in defiance than protection of community interests. Even 
in debates leading up to the Libyan intervention, some members of the Security Council 
questioned whether the new principle only masked the old geopolitical rationales for regime 
change (Westervelt 2011; Tourinho, Stuenkel, and Brockmeier 2016). Indeed, the R2P 
principle itself has come under criticism by developing countries as a tool of Western great 
power management. Brazil, for example, pushed back against the creative use of the R2P 
principle by formulating the ‘Responsibility While Protecting’ principle as a check against the 
behaviour of the protectors. It remains to be seen whether the UN Security Council will 
continue to uphold R2P through the use of international sanctions, solidifying it as a 
constitutive principle of international society, or whether it remains in the eye of many a fig 
leaf for self-interested intervention on the part of great powers. It is too much to expect the UN 
to become less of the ‘intensely political institution’ (Berdal 2016, 8) it has been since its 
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inception. But this does not mean that the solidarity required to heighten the effectiveness of 
international sanctions and bolster new normative principles cannot happen. 
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